BMC West Corporation v. Desert Crest Development, Jessica Barker : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
BMC West Corporation v. Desert Crest
Development, Jessica Barker : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
F. Mark Hansen; Counsel for Appellee.
Gary H. Weight; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight and Esplin; Counsel for Appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, BMC West Corporation v. Desert Crest Development, Jessica Barker, No. 20010269 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3215
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BMC WEST CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DESERT CREST DEVELOPMENT, 
JESSICA BARKER and DOES 1-20, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 20010269-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDER OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE 
GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT, TO DECLARE ADMITTED 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS, FOR RULE 37 SANCTIONS, AND 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
F. MARK HANSEN (5078) 
F. Mark Hansen, P.C. 
431 North 1300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Telephone: (801) 517-3530 
Counsel for Appellee 
GARY H. WEIGHT (3415) 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone: (801) 373-4912 D 
Counsel for Appellants 
0C1 0 9 2001 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH u"' 
A p R ' 3 zooi 
BMC West Corporation, No. 20010269-SC 
Plaintiff 
v. 
Desert Crest Development, Inc., 
Jessica Barker, Does 1-20, 
Defendants 
ORDER 
The court defers ruling on plaintiff's motion for summary 
disposition until further consideration and also suspends rule 
10(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The parties 
should proceed to the next stage in the appellate process. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Date Richard C. Howe, 
Chief Justice 
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I hereby certify that on April 17, 2001, a true and correct copy 
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the parties listed below: 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BMC WEST CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DESERT CREST DEVELOPMENT, 
JESSICA BARKER, and DOES 1-20, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 20010269-CA 
Priority No. 15 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN STRIKING 
EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 37 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
A. This issue was properly preserved below. 
Appellee asserts that appellants failed to properly preserve this issue in the trial 
court and are, therefore, barred from raising the issue on appeal. However, what is 
required for preservation of an issue is that it be presented to the trial court "in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon." Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 
239 at TJ26, 8 P.3d 281. Clearly the issue of Rule 37 sanctions was presented to the trial 
court. Appellee requested said sanctions. The trial court considered the request and 
ultimately granted such sanctions. The minute entry of January 23, 2001, indicates that 
"Pursuant to Rule 37, deft's are not allowed to introduce matters into evidence in 
opposition to 11-30-99 affidavit of Charles Rhodes" (R. 309). In addition, the signed 
Order of February 7, 2001, includes the same language (R. 315). Appellants were not 
'required to file an objection or a post-judgment motion objecting to the order as a 
1 
prerequisite to filing an appeal. Sittner v. Schnever, 2000 UT 45 at [^16, 2 P.3d 442. 
Accordingly, appellants assert that this issue was properly preserved as it was raised and 
considered by the trial court. 
B. The evidence was struck pursuant to Rule 37 and not Rule 56(c). 
Appellee's contend that the affidavits of Desert Crest and Jessica Barker were 
stricken on "the independent grounds it was not based on the affiant's personal 
knowledge, and [was] therefore offered in violation of Rule 56(c)" (Br. of Appellee at 
22). However, while appellee may have requested that the affidavits be stricken pursuant 
to Rule 56(e) (R. 231, 232), there is no language in either the trial court's minute entry 
granting appellee's motion to strike and motio for summary judgment (R. 309) or the 
actual written order which indicates that the affidavits were stricken pursuant to Rule 56 
(R. 315-16). Instead what the trial court relied on in striking the affidavits was Rule 37 
(R. 309, 315-16). Any vague incorporation by reference of language from appellee's 
supporting memorandum is insufficient to establish that the trial court relied on Rule 56 
in striking the affidavits. Accordingly, appellee cannot rely on Rule 56 as an idependent 
ground for affirming the trial court's striking of the affidavits pursuant to Rule 37. 
C. The trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence (including the 
affidavits of Desert Crest and Jessica Barker) as a sanction under Rule 37. 
This Court reviews a trial court's decisions in regards to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure for an abuse of discretion. This Court will find an abuse of discretion 
when "there is either 'an erroneous conclusion of law or... no evidentiary basis for the 
trial court's ruling.'" Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75 at If 16, 999 P.2d 588, cert. 
denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000) (citation omitted). However, before imposing sanctions 
under Rule 37, the "trial court must find on the part of the noncomplying party 
willfulness, bad faith, or fault, or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial 
2 
process." Hales, 2000 UT App 75 at [^16; Morton v. Continental Banking Co., 938 P.2d 
271, 274 (Utah 1997). Because the trial court failed to find that appellants acted 
willfully, in bad faith or engaged in persistent dilatory tactics which frustrated the judicial 
process this Court should find that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the 
sanction of excluding/striking "evidence in opposition to the November 30, 1999, 
Affidavit of Charles Rhodes" without first satisfying the preliminary requirements under 
Rule 37 (R. 315, 309). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF 
A. This issue was preserved below and is adequately briefed. 
Appellee asserts that appellants failed to properly preserve this issue in the trial 
court and are, therefore, barred from raising the issue on appeal. However, what is 
required for preservation of an issue is that it be presented to the trial court "in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon." Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 
239 at ^|26, 8 P.3d 281. Clearly the issue of summary judgment was presented to the trial 
court. Appellee twice moved the trial court to grant summary judgment (R. 143, 227-80). 
The trial court denied the first motion (R. 183) and granted the second motion which 
formed the basis of this appeal (R. 309, 315). Appellants were not required to file an 
objection or a post-judgment motion objecting to the order as a prerequisite to filing an 
appeal. Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45 at 116, 2 P.3d 442. Accordingly, appellants 
assert that this issue was properly preserved as it was raised and considered by the trial 
court. 
3 
In addition, appellee claims that appellants have failed to adequately brief this 
issue. However, appellants have adequately briefed this issue providing both analysis and 
pertinent legal authority as required by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Cf. Phillips v. 
Hadfield, 904 P.2d 1108 (Utah App. 1995). 
B. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is only appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, 
admissions, affidavits, and other evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Krantz v. Holt, 
819 P.2d 352 (Utah 1991); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803 (Utah 1991). 
The trial court previously, on February 4, 2000, denied appellee's motion for summary 
judgment and found that "there are disputed issues of material fact" (R. 183). 
Appellants assert that at the time the Court granted appellee's motion for summary 
judgment in January-February of 2001 there are still disputed issues of material fact 
which have been set forth in appellants' brief, and accordingly, the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment. See, Hatch v. Sugarhouse Fin. Co., 434 P.2d 758 (Utah 
1967) (Where pleadings and counteraffidavit of defendant raise issue of fact summary 
judgment is improper). Particularly where the trial court, as established supra, erred in 
imposing the sanction under Rule 37 of striking evidence without first finding that 
appellants' noncompliance was done willfully, in bad faith, or by use of persistent 
dilatory tactics which have frustrated the judicial process. Cf. Boice v. Marble, 982 P.2d 
565 (Utah 1999) (Where trial court erred in striking expert testimony which would have 
raised a material issue of fact, the grant of summary judgment was erroneous). 
4 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants ask that this Court reverse the orders of the 
trial court and remand the matter to Third District Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z?*ay of October, 2001. 
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Gary H. Weight 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Counsel for Appellants 
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